So sánh phương pháp

	Phân tích kênh phụ (Side-Channel Analysis)	Hệ mật mã RSA
Lĩnh vực	Mật mã học	Mật mã học
Họ	Machine learning	Machine learning
Năm ra đời	1996	1978
Người khởi xướng	Paul Kocher	Ronald Rivest
Loại	physical side-channel exploitation	asymmetric encryption algorithm
Công trình gốc	Kocher, P. C. (1996). Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and other systems. In Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 1996, LNCS 1109, pp. 104-113.	Rivest, R. L., Shamir, A., & Adleman, L. (1978). A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems. Communications of the ACM, 21(2), 120-126.
Tên gọi khác	SCA, timing attack, power analysis, cache attack	RSA encryption, RSA public-key cryptography
Liên quan	3	4
Tóm tắt	Side-channel analysis is a family of attacks that exploit physical properties of cryptographic implementations (timing, power consumption, electromagnetic emissions, cache behavior) to recover secret keys. Introduced by Paul Kocher in 1996, side-channel attacks have repeatedly broken implementations of theoretically secure cryptosystems by leveraging unintended information leakage. Side-channel analysis has become a critical concern in cryptographic system design, requiring constant-time implementations and physical countermeasures.	RSA is a foundational public-key cryptosystem developed by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman in 1978. It enables secure encryption and digital signatures by using a pair of mathematically linked keys: a public key for encryption and a private key for decryption. RSA's security relies on the computational difficulty of factoring large composite numbers into their prime factors.