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| Đấu giá giá đầu tiên× | Mô hình Cạnh tranh Cournot× | |
|---|---|---|
| Lĩnh vực | Lý thuyết trò chơi | Lý thuyết trò chơi |
| Họ | Machine learning | Machine learning |
| Năm ra đời≠ | 1961 | 1838 |
| Người khởi xướng≠ | William Vickrey | Augustin-Louis Cournot |
| Loại | algorithm | algorithm |
| Công trình gốc≠ | Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed bids. The Journal of Finance, 16(1), 8-37. DOI ↗ | Cournot, A. A. (1838). Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie des richesses. L. Hachette. link ↗ |
| Tên gọi khác | FPSB, Sealed-Bid Auction, Bid-Equal-Price Auction | Quantity Competition, Cournot Equilibrium, Cournot-Nash Equilibrium |
| Liên quan | 4 | 4 |
| Tóm tắt≠ | A first-price auction is a sealed-bid mechanism where all participants submit bids simultaneously without knowing others' bids. The highest bidder wins and pays their own bid (the price they offered). Systematically analyzed by William Vickrey in 1961, first-price auctions require bidders to balance between winning and profit, leading to strategic underbidding relative to true valuations in equilibrium. | Cournot Competition models oligopolistic markets where firms choose quantities simultaneously, not prices. Originally formulated by Augustin-Louis Cournot in 1838, the model assumes each firm's profit depends on the total market quantity produced. The resulting Cournot-Nash Equilibrium captures the strategic interaction where each firm maximizes profit given competitors' quantities, leading to prices between monopoly and perfect competition levels. |
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