So sánh phương pháp

	Expected Utility Model of War	Militarized Interstate Dispute Analysis
Lĩnh vực	International Relations	International Relations
Họ	MCDM	Process / pipeline
Năm ra đời	1981	1996
Người khởi xướng	Bruce Bueno de Mesquita	Daniel Jones, Stuart Bremer & J. David Singer (Correlates of War project)
Loại	Formal rational-choice model of conflict initiation	Coding and statistical analysis of interstate militarized confrontations
Công trình gốc	Bueno de Mesquita, B. (1981). The War Trap. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.	Jones, D. M., Bremer, S. A., & Singer, J. D. (1996). Militarized interstate disputes, 1816–1992: Rationale, coding rules, and empirical patterns. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 15(2), 163–213.
Tên gọi khác	Expected Utility Theory of War, The War Trap Model, Rational Choice Model of War Initiation, Expected-Utility Conflict Model	MID Analysis, Militarized Dispute Coding, Correlates of War Dispute Analysis, Dyadic Conflict Onset Analysis
Liên quan	3	3
Tóm tắt	The expected utility model of war, introduced by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita in The War Trap (1981), treats the decision to initiate international conflict as a rational gamble. A leader is modeled as comparing the utility of the outcome they could win against the utility of the outcome they could lose, each weighted by the probability of winning or losing, and is predicted to challenge another state only when this expected utility is positive. It was among the first attempts to derive testable predictions about war initiation from explicit assumptions of rational, utility-maximizing decision making.	Militarized interstate dispute (MID) analysis is the coding and quantitative study of confrontations in which one state threatens, displays, or uses military force against another. Built on the Correlates of War project's MID dataset and the coding rules codified by Jones, Bremer, and Singer (1996), it provides the standard observational measure of interstate conflict short of and including war, structured as dyad-years so that the onset, escalation, and outcomes of disputes can be modeled statistically across two centuries of the international system.