So sánh phương pháp

	Developmental State Analysis	Comparative Political Economy
Lĩnh vực	Political Economy	Political Economy
Họ	Process / pipeline	Process / pipeline
Năm ra đời	1982	2001
Người khởi xướng	Chalmers Johnson & Peter Evans	Comparative politics & political economy tradition (Shonfield, Katzenstein, Hall, Soskice)
Loại	Comparative institutional analysis framework	Macro-comparative research framework
Công trình gốc	Johnson, C. (1982). MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975. Stanford University Press. ISBN: 9780804712064	Hall, P. A., & Soskice, D. (Eds.). (2001). Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford University Press. ISBN: 9780199247752
Tên gọi khác	Developmental State Theory, Embedded Autonomy Approach, State-Led Industrialization Analysis, Plan-Rational State Analysis	CPE, Comparative Capitalisms Approach, Macro-Comparative Political Economy, Institutional Political Economy
Liên quan	3	3
Tóm tắt	Developmental state analysis is a state-centered framework for explaining rapid, state-led industrialization, built from Chalmers Johnson's 1982 study of Japan's MITI and Peter Evans's 1995 theory of embedded autonomy. Its central claim is that in the high-growth economies of East Asia the state did not merely set the rules or correct market failures but actively steered economic transformation — picking sectors, allocating credit, disciplining firms, and coordinating investment — through a meritocratic bureaucracy housed in a powerful pilot agency. The framework analyzes when and how a state acquires the capacity and the relationship to business that let such guidance promote development rather than predation.	Comparative political economy (CPE) is the subfield that asks how political institutions and markets interact to produce different economic outcomes across capitalist democracies, and the macro-comparative research strategy that subfield employs. Rather than treating the economy as a self-contained system, CPE treats production regimes, labor markets, finance, welfare states, and innovation as politically constructed and institutionally embedded, then compares how distinct national configurations — for instance the liberal market economies and coordinated market economies of Hall and Soskice's varieties-of-capitalism framework — generate systematically different patterns of wages, growth, inequality, and adjustment. The approach combines small-N case comparison and large-N cross-national analysis under a shared institutionalist logic.