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| Crisis Bargaining Game× | Audience Cost Analysis× | |
|---|---|---|
| Lĩnh vực | International Relations | International Relations |
| Họ | MCDM | MCDM |
| Năm ra đời | 1994 | 1994 |
| Người khởi xướng≠ | Formalized by James Fearon and others (building on Schelling) | James D. Fearon |
| Loại≠ | Extensive-form game of sequential crisis escalation | Formal signaling mechanism in crisis bargaining |
| Công trình gốc | Fearon, J. D. (1994). Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes. American Political Science Review, 88(3), 577–592. DOI ↗ | Fearon, J. D. (1994). Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes. American Political Science Review, 88(3), 577–592. DOI ↗ |
| Tên gọi khác | International Crisis Game, Escalation Game, Signaling Game of Crisis Bargaining, Deterrence Crisis Game | Audience Costs Theory, Domestic Audience Cost Model, Tying-Hands Signaling, Audience Cost Mechanism |
| Liên quan | 3 | 3 |
| Tóm tắt≠ | A crisis bargaining game is a formal, usually extensive-form model in which two states sequentially choose to challenge, escalate, stand firm, or back down during an international dispute, and the analyst solves for the equilibrium pattern of escalation and concession. Building on Schelling's strategy of conflict and given an influential treatment in Fearon's (1994) model of escalation as a war of attrition, these games make explicit how incomplete information about each side's resolve, and the costs each pays for backing down, shape whether a crisis ends in mutual accommodation, capitulation, or war. | Audience cost analysis studies how the domestic political punishment a leader expects for publicly backing down from an international threat makes that threat credible. Introduced formally by James Fearon (1994), the mechanism explains why a leader who escalates a crisis in public ties their own hands: retreating would expose them to costs imposed by domestic audiences for looking weak or incompetent. These accumulating audience costs let states signal resolve, and because democracies can generate larger and more reliable audience costs, the concept underpins prominent arguments about regime type, crisis behavior, and the democratic peace. |
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