So sánh phương pháp

	Common-Pool Resource Analysis	Public Goods Game
Lĩnh vực	Political Economy	Tâm lý học xã hội
Họ	MCDM	Process / pipeline
Năm ra đời	1990	2000
Người khởi xướng	Garrett Hardin & Elinor Ostrom	Experimental economics tradition; Fehr & Gachter (cooperation and punishment)
Loại	Institutional analysis framework for shared resources	Multi-player social-dilemma paradigm
Công trình gốc	Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 9780521405997	Fehr, E., & Gachter, S. (2000). Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments. American Economic Review, 90(4), 980-994.
Tên gọi khác	Commons Governance Analysis, Ostrom Design Principles, Tragedy of the Commons Analysis, CPR Analysis	Voluntary Contribution Mechanism, Common-Pool Contribution Game, Linear Public Goods Game
Liên quan	4	3
Tóm tắt	Common-pool resource (CPR) analysis is a framework for diagnosing why shared natural and man-made resources are prone to overuse and for identifying the institutional conditions under which user communities can govern them sustainably without privatization or top-down state control. A common-pool resource is rivalrous (one user's consumption subtracts from what is available to others) yet costly to exclude users from. Garrett Hardin's 1968 'tragedy of the commons' framed the pessimistic baseline in which rational appropriators collectively destroy the resource, while Elinor Ostrom's 1990 Governing the Commons established, through extensive empirical work, eight design principles that distinguish durable self-governing commons from those that collapse.	The public goods game is the canonical multi-person social dilemma used to study cooperation. Each member of a group is endowed with money and simultaneously decides how much to keep privately and how much to contribute to a common pool; the pool is multiplied and split equally among all members regardless of contribution. Because the marginal per-capita return is less than one but the group return exceeds one, every individual is privately better off free-riding while the group is collectively better off if all contribute -- the defining tension of a social dilemma. Experiments consistently show people contribute well above the self-interested zero, but contributions decay over repeated rounds unless institutions intervene. Fehr and Gachter's influential demonstration that allowing players to pay to punish free-riders restores and sustains high cooperation made the paradigm central to research on norms, altruistic punishment, and collective action.