The Evidential Problem of Evil

The inductive argument that the amount, distribution, or apparent pointlessness of suffering makes the existence of God improbable, even if not logically impossible.

Definition

An argument that treats the existence of seemingly pointless or gratuitous evil as inductive evidence lowering the probability that an omnipotent, wholly good God exists.

Scope

This topic covers evidential or probabilistic arguments from evil, especially Rowe's argument from apparently gratuitous suffering and Draper's argument from the distribution of pain and pleasure, together with the principal reply of skeptical theism. It does not cover the logical problem, which alleges strict inconsistency, nor full-blown theodicies offered as positive explanations.

Core questions

• Does any actual suffering appear to serve no outweighing good?
• Is the inference from 'we can see no justifying reason' to 'there is no justifying reason' legitimate?
• Does the pattern of pain and pleasure fit naturalism better than theism?
• Can skeptical theism block the inference without undermining moral knowledge?

Key theories

Rowe's evidential argument

Rowe argues that instances of intense suffering, such as a fawn dying slowly in a forest fire, appear to serve no greater good, and that the most reasonable conclusion is that some suffering is genuinely gratuitous, which an omnipotent good God would prevent.

Skeptical theism

Wykstra replies that, given the vast cognitive gap between God and humans, our failure to discern a justifying reason for an evil is poor evidence that none exists, so the inference from apparent to genuine gratuitousness is unwarranted.

History

After Plantinga's free will defense was widely held to answer the logical problem, attention shifted to evidential formulations. Rowe's 1979 paper became the focal statement, and Draper's 1989 argument reframed the issue as a comparison of theism with a hypothesis of indifference. Wykstra's 1984 paper launched the skeptical-theist reply that has dominated subsequent discussion.

Debates

Whether apparent gratuitousness implies real gratuitousness

Rowe holds that the appearance of pointless suffering is good evidence of its reality; skeptical theists such as Wykstra argue our limited cognitive access to God's purposes makes such appearances unreliable evidence.

Whether the distribution of suffering favors naturalism

Draper argues that the biological role of pain and pleasure is more probable on indifference than on theism; critics question the prior probabilities and the framing of the competing hypotheses.

Key figures

• William Rowe
• Paul Draper
• Stephen Wykstra
• William Alston
• J. L. Mackie

Seminal works

• rowe1979
• draper1989
• wykstra1984

Frequently asked questions

How does the evidential problem differ from the logical problem?

The logical problem claims that God and evil are strictly contradictory, while the evidential problem concedes they may be compatible but argues that the actual evils we observe make God's existence improbable.

What is skeptical theism?

It is the view that human beings are not in a good epistemic position to judge whether an apparent evil really lacks a justifying reason, which is used to block the inference from seemingly pointless suffering to the conclusion that God does not exist.