Yöntem Karşılaştırma
Seçtiğiniz yöntemleri yan yana inceleyin; farklı satırlar vurgulanır.
| Selectorate Theory Analysis× | Democratic Peace Analysis× | |
|---|---|---|
| Alan | International Relations | International Relations |
| Aile≠ | MCDM | Process / pipeline |
| Köken yılı≠ | 2003 | 1993 |
| Köken≠ | Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson & James Morrow | Zeev Maoz & Bruce Russett (and the broader democratic-peace literature) |
| Tür≠ | Formal theory of leader survival and policy choice | Observational dyadic test of the regime-type/conflict relationship |
| Seminal kaynak≠ | Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003). The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. link ↗ | Maoz, Z., & Russett, B. (1993). Normative and structural causes of democratic peace, 1946–1986. American Political Science Review, 87(3), 624–638. DOI ↗ |
| Diğer adlar | Selectorate Theory, Logic of Political Survival, Winning Coalition Analysis, Selectorate Model of Governance | Democratic Peace Theory Testing, Dyadic Democratic Peace Analysis, Joint Democracy and Conflict Analysis, Liberal Peace Analysis |
| İlişkili | 3 | 3 |
| Özet≠ | Selectorate theory, developed by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson, and James Morrow in The Logic of Political Survival (2003), explains policy and foreign-policy behavior as a by-product of leaders' overriding goal: staying in power. Every leader depends on a winning coalition (W) drawn from a larger selectorate (S) of those with a say in choosing leaders. The relative size of W and S determines whether a leader buys loyalty with broad public goods or narrow private rewards — which in turn shapes growth, war, peace, and the survival of regimes. | Democratic peace analysis is the empirical study of the proposition that democracies rarely or never fight one another. Building on the dyadic research design crystallized by Maoz and Russett (1993), it codes the regime type of each state, constructs dyad-years, and models the probability of militarized conflict as a function of joint democracy alongside controls for power, contiguity, alliances, and trade. The approach has produced one of the most robust empirical regularities in international relations and a long debate over whether shared norms or institutional structures account for it. |
| ScholarGateVeri seti ↗ |
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