Yöntem Karşılaştırma

	Resource Curse Analysis	State Autonomy Analysis
Alan	Political Economy	Political Economy
Aile	Regression model	Process / pipeline
Köken yılı	2001	1984
Köken	Jeffrey Sachs & Andrew Warner (growth); Michael Ross (democracy)	Theda Skocpol, Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer & Michael Mann
Tür	Cross-country regression analysis of resource dependence	State-centered analytical framework
Seminal kaynak	Sachs, J. D., & Warner, A. M. (2001). Natural Resources and Economic Development: The Curse of Natural Resources. European Economic Review, 45(4-6), 827-838.	Evans, P. B., Rueschemeyer, D., & Skocpol, T. (Eds.). (1985). Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 9780521313131
Diğer adlar	Natural Resource Curse Analysis, Paradox of Plenty Analysis, Rentier State Analysis, Resource Dependence Regression	State-Centered Analysis, Relative Autonomy Analysis, Infrastructural Power Analysis, Bringing the State Back In Approach
İlişkili	3	3
Özet	Resource curse analysis is the empirical study of the paradox that economies rich in natural resources — oil, gas, minerals — often grow more slowly, remain less democratic, and suffer more conflict than resource-poor economies. Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner's influential work, summarized in their 2001 European Economic Review article, documented a robust negative cross-country correlation between resource dependence and economic growth. Michael Ross's 2001 World Politics article extended the logic to politics, showing statistically that oil wealth is associated with weaker democracy through rentier, repression, and modernization mechanisms. The workhorse method is a cross-country regression of growth or democracy on a measure of resource dependence with controls for the standard determinants of development.	State autonomy analysis treats the state not as a neutral arena or a simple instrument of the dominant class but as an organization with interests, capacities, and powers of its own. Crystallized in the 1985 volume Bringing the State Back In edited by Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, and given a sharp conceptual edge by Michael Mann's 1984 distinction between despotic and infrastructural power, the framework asks two linked questions: how far can a state formulate goals independent of the preferences of dominant social classes (autonomy), and how effectively can it actually implement those goals across its territory (capacity)? The approach reoriented comparative political economy away from purely society-centered explanations.