Yöntem Karşılaştırma

	Prospect Theory in International Relations	Expected Utility Model of War
Alan	International Relations	International Relations
Aile	Process / pipeline	MCDM
Köken yılı	1997	1981
Köken	Kahneman & Tversky (theory); Jack Levy and others (IR application)	Bruce Bueno de Mesquita
Tür	Behavioral decision-theoretic framework for foreign-policy choice	Formal rational-choice model of conflict initiation
Seminal kaynak	Levy, J. S. (1997). Prospect theory, rational choice, and international relations. International Studies Quarterly, 41(1), 87–112.	Bueno de Mesquita, B. (1981). The War Trap. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Diğer adlar	Prospect Theory IR, Loss Aversion in Foreign Policy, Framing and Risk in International Relations, Behavioral Decision Theory in IR	Expected Utility Theory of War, The War Trap Model, Rational Choice Model of War Initiation, Expected-Utility Conflict Model
İlişkili	3	3
Özet	Prospect theory, the behavioral account of choice under risk developed by Kahneman and Tversky, has been applied across international relations to explain foreign-policy decisions that expected-utility models struggle with. As surveyed and assessed by Jack Levy (1997), the key ideas are that leaders evaluate outcomes as gains and losses relative to a reference point rather than in absolute terms, that losses loom larger than equivalent gains (loss aversion), and that people are risk-averse for gains but risk-seeking to avoid losses. These departures from rationality illuminate why states gamble to recover losses and take excessive risks to defend the status quo.	The expected utility model of war, introduced by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita in The War Trap (1981), treats the decision to initiate international conflict as a rational gamble. A leader is modeled as comparing the utility of the outcome they could win against the utility of the outcome they could lose, each weighted by the probability of winning or losing, and is predicted to challenge another state only when this expected utility is positive. It was among the first attempts to derive testable predictions about war initiation from explicit assumptions of rational, utility-maximizing decision making.