Yöntem Karşılaştırma

	Power Resources Analysis	Median Voter Model
Alan	Political Economy	Political Economy
Aile	Process / pipeline	MCDM
Köken yılı	1983	1948
Köken	Walter Korpi & Gosta Esping-Andersen	Duncan Black & Anthony Downs
Tür	Comparative political economy theory	Formal model of electoral competition
Seminal kaynak	Korpi, W. (1983). The Democratic Class Struggle. Routledge & Kegan Paul. ISBN: 9780710094490	Black, D. (1948). On the Rationale of Group Decision-making. Journal of Political Economy, 56(1), 23-34.
Diğer adlar	Power Resources Theory, Power Resource Approach, Class Mobilization Theory, Korpi Power Resources Model	Median Voter Theorem, Black's Median Voter Theorem, Downsian Median Voter Model, Median Voter Equilibrium
İlişkili	4	4
Özet	Power resources analysis is a comparative political-economy framework, developed above all by Walter Korpi in The Democratic Class Struggle (1983) and extended by Gosta Esping-Andersen in The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990), that explains the size and shape of welfare states by the distribution of power resources between social classes. Its central claim is that under democratic capitalism the working class can offset capital's structural advantage in markets by mobilizing political power resources — above all the organizational strength of trade unions and the governing strength of left and labor parties. Where labor is strongly organized and durably in government, it builds class coalitions that translate that power into generous, redistributive social policy and a high degree of decommodification: the extent to which citizens can maintain a livelihood without depending on the market.	The median voter model is a foundational result of political economy stating that, under majority rule with voters whose preferences are single-peaked on a single policy dimension, the ideal point of the median voter is the Condorcet winner — it cannot be beaten by any other alternative in pairwise majority voting. Duncan Black established the theorem formally in 1948, and Anthony Downs extended it in 1957 into a theory of party competition in which two vote-maximizing parties converge to the median voter's preferred policy. The model is the workhorse linking the distribution of citizen preferences to equilibrium policy outcomes in democracies.