Yöntem Karşılaştırma

	Comparative Foreign Policy Analysis	Two-Level Game Analysis
Alan	International Relations	Political Science
Aile	Process / pipeline	MCDM
Köken yılı	2005	1988
Köken	James Rosenau (CFP); Valerie Hudson and the Foreign Policy Analysis tradition	Robert D. Putnam
Tür	Comparative, multi-level explanation of foreign-policy behavior	Framework for analyzing international negotiation under domestic constraints
Seminal kaynak	Hudson, V. M. (2005). Foreign policy analysis: Actor-specific theory and the ground of international relations. Foreign Policy Analysis, 1(1), 1–30.	Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. International Organization, 42(3), 427-460.
Diğer adlar	Comparative Foreign Policy, CFP Analysis, Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), Comparative Study of Foreign Policy Behavior	Two-Level Games, Putnam Two-Level Game Framework, Win-Set Analysis, Double-Edged Diplomacy
İlişkili	3	4
Özet	Comparative Foreign Policy (CFP) analysis explains the foreign-policy behavior of states by opening the 'black box' of decision making and comparing how foreign policy is produced across countries, leaders, and contexts. Part of the broader Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) tradition that Valerie Hudson (2005) characterizes as actor-specific theory, it draws on factors at multiple levels — individual leaders, small groups and bureaucracies, domestic society, and the international system — to account for why different states (or the same state at different times) behave as they do. Its hallmark is the systematic comparison of decision processes and outputs.	Two-level game analysis is a framework introduced by Robert Putnam in 1988 for understanding how international negotiations are jointly shaped by bargaining between governments and the need to win domestic approval. A negotiator plays simultaneously at two tables: Level I, where states bargain over an agreement, and Level II, where that agreement must be ratified by domestic constituents. The key analytic device is the win-set — the set of Level I deals that could secure domestic ratification — and an agreement is possible only where the negotiating states' win-sets overlap.