Public Choice Analysis
Public choice analysis is the application of the methods of economics — methodological individualism, rational self-interest, and equilibrium reasoning — to the study of political and collective decision-making. Pioneered by James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock in their 1962 book The Calculus of Consent and surveyed comprehensively in Dennis Mueller's Public Choice III, it treats voters, politicians, bureaucrats, and interest groups not as benevolent servants of the public interest but as utility-maximizing agents pursuing their own goals within political institutions. A central methodological move is the distinction between constitutional choice — the selection of the rules of the game behind a veil of uncertainty — and in-period choice within those rules. The framework's signature derivation is the optimal decision rule (the optimal majority), found by minimizing the sum of the external costs a rule imposes and the costs of reaching agreement under it.
Rekodi ya chanzo
Nukuu zimehamishwa kwa uhalisi kutoka kwa rekodi ya chanzo cha mbinu. Hakuna uthibitisho wa kiwango cha dai unaodokezwa kutoka kwao.
- Buchanan, J. M., & Tullock, G. (1962). The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. University of Michigan Press. · ISBN 9780865972186
- Mueller, D. C. (2003). Public Choice III. Cambridge University Press. · ISBN 9780521894753
Madai yaliyotunzwa
Madai yamehifadhiwa katika daftari la ushahidi, kila moja ikiwa na tathmini yake.
Mwonekano huu haubuni tathmini ya dai wakati daftari haina yoyote.
Mbinu zinazohusiana
Zilizotengenezwa kutoka kwa grafu ya mbinu na kuonyeshwa kama uhusiano uliopendekezwa na mashine — hakuna dai la ushahidi linalodokezwa.