Jämför metoder
Granska de valda metoderna sida vid sida; rader som skiljer sig är markerade.
| Political Survival Analysis× | State Autonomy Analysis× | |
|---|---|---|
| Ämnesområde | Political Economy | Political Economy |
| Familj≠ | Survival analysis | Process / pipeline |
| Ursprungsår≠ | 2003 | 1984 |
| Upphovsperson≠ | Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al.; Janet Box-Steffensmeier & Bradford Jones | Theda Skocpol, Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer & Michael Mann |
| Typ≠ | Survival / event-history regression model | State-centered analytical framework |
| Ursprungskälla≠ | Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003). The Logic of Political Survival. MIT Press. ISBN: 9780262025461 | Evans, P. B., Rueschemeyer, D., & Skocpol, T. (Eds.). (1985). Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 9780521313131 |
| Alias | Leader Survival Analysis, Government Duration Analysis, Selectorate Survival Model, Political Event-History Analysis | State-Centered Analysis, Relative Autonomy Analysis, Infrastructural Power Analysis, Bringing the State Back In Approach |
| Närliggande | 3 | 3 |
| Sammanfattning≠ | Political survival analysis applies survival and event-history models to the time leaders, governments, and regimes remain in power before failing. Methodologically it rests on the hazard-modeling apparatus codified for social scientists by Box-Steffensmeier and Jones in 2004 — the Cox proportional-hazards model and parametric alternatives such as the Weibull, estimated on duration data with censoring. Substantively it is anchored in the selectorate theory of Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow's 2003 The Logic of Political Survival, which explains the hazard of losing office in terms of the size of the winning coalition (W) and the selectorate (S). The model links institutional structure and performance to the risk that an incumbent's tenure ends. | State autonomy analysis treats the state not as a neutral arena or a simple instrument of the dominant class but as an organization with interests, capacities, and powers of its own. Crystallized in the 1985 volume Bringing the State Back In edited by Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, and given a sharp conceptual edge by Michael Mann's 1984 distinction between despotic and infrastructural power, the framework asks two linked questions: how far can a state formulate goals independent of the preferences of dominant social classes (autonomy), and how effectively can it actually implement those goals across its territory (capacity)? The approach reoriented comparative political economy away from purely society-centered explanations. |
| ScholarGateDatamängd ↗ |
|
|