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	Political Cleavage Analysis	Electoral System Analysis
Ämnesområde	Political Economy	Political Economy
Familj	Process / pipeline	Process / pipeline
Ursprungsår	1967	1954
Upphovsperson	Seymour Martin Lipset & Stein Rokkan	Maurice Duverger; Arend Lijphart; Rein Taagepera & Matthew Shugart
Typ	Historical-comparative framework	Comparative institutional analysis framework
Ursprungskälla	Lipset, S. M., & Rokkan, S. (1967). Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction. In S. M. Lipset & S. Rokkan (Eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments. Free Press. ISBN: 9780029191507	Duverger, M. (1954). Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. Wiley. ISBN: 9780416683202
Alias	Lipset-Rokkan Model, Cleavage Structure Analysis, Social Cleavage Theory, Cleavage Politics Framework	Electoral Systems Analysis, Analysis of Electoral Rules, Votes-to-Seats Analysis
Närliggande	3	3
Sammanfattning	Political cleavage analysis explains the structure of party systems by reference to durable social divisions, following Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan's 1967 account of cleavage structures, party systems, and voter alignments. Their argument is that the national and industrial revolutions produced four enduring cleavages — center versus periphery, state versus church, land versus industry, and owner versus worker — and that these divisions, frozen into party systems by the time of mass enfranchisement, continued to organize voter alignments long afterward. A full cleavage, as later refined by Bartolini and Mair, requires more than a social division: it needs a collective identity and an organizational expression that translate the division into politics.	Electoral system analysis examines how the rules for translating votes into seats shape the proportionality of representation and the format of the party system. Maurice Duverger's 1954 work established the foundational propositions — that single-member plurality tends toward two-party competition while proportional representation favors multipartism — through the joint operation of a mechanical effect (how the seat-allocation rule itself distorts the vote) and a psychological effect (how voters and elites anticipate that rule and behave strategically). Rein Taagepera and Matthew Shugart (1989) put the field on a quantitative footing by showing how district magnitude and other parameters systematically determine outcomes, and Arend Lijphart (1994) provided the major comparative study of disproportionality and party systems across democracies. The method reads electoral rules as a powerful, designed lever over the structure of political competition.