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| Corruption Perception Measurement× | Regulatory Enforcement Analysis× | |
|---|---|---|
| Ämnesområde | Public Administration | Public Administration |
| Familj | Process / pipeline | Process / pipeline |
| Ursprungsår≠ | 1995 | 1992 |
| Upphovsperson≠ | Transparency International | Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite |
| Typ≠ | Composite perception index | Analytical / strategic framework |
| Ursprungskälla≠ | Transparency International. Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI): methodology and annual results. Transparency International, Berlin. link ↗ | Ayres, I., & Braithwaite, J. (1992). Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN: 9780195070705 |
| Alias | Corruption Perceptions Index Method, Perceived Corruption Measurement, CPI Aggregation Method, Corruption Scoring | Responsive Regulation Analysis, Enforcement Pyramid Analysis, Compliance and Enforcement Analysis, Regulatory Strategy Analysis |
| Närliggande | 4 | 4 |
| Sammanfattning≠ | Corruption perception measurement quantifies how corrupt the public sector of a country is perceived to be, since actual corruption is hidden and cannot be observed directly. The canonical instrument, Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), combines multiple independent expert assessments and business surveys into a single composite score per country. Each source is standardised onto a common scale and the rescaled scores are averaged, producing an index that ranks countries and tracks perceived integrity over time. The method explicitly reports uncertainty, echoing the aggregation logic of the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators. | Regulatory enforcement analysis examines how regulators secure compliance — when they persuade, when they punish, and how they choose between the two. Its central framework is responsive regulation, set out by Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite in their 1992 book, which argues that enforcement should be tit-for-tat and proportionate: start with dialogue and persuasion, but escalate up an enforcement pyramid to warnings, civil penalties, licence suspension and ultimately prohibition for actors who persist in non-compliance. The analysis maps a regulator's strategies onto this pyramid and assesses how well its responses are matched to the motivations of the regulated. |
| ScholarGateDatamängd ↗ |
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