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Krahasoni metodat

Shqyrtoni metodat e zgjedhura krah për krah; rreshtat që ndryshojnë janë të theksuar.

Ekuilibri i Përsosur i Nënlojrave×Teoria Evolucioniste e Lojërave×
FushaTeoria e lojëraveTeoria e lojërave
FamiljaMachine learningMachine learning
Viti i origjinës19651973
KrijuesiReinhard SeltenJohn Maynard Smith, George Price
Llojialgorithmalgorithm
Burimi themeluesSelten, R. (1965). Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit. Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 121, 301-324. link ↗Smith, J. M., & Price, G. R. (1973). The logic of animal conflict. Nature, 246(5427), 15-18. DOI ↗
Emërtime të tjeraBackward Induction, Sequential Equilibrium, Extensive-Form EquilibriumESS, Evolutionarily Stable Strategy, Replicator Dynamics
Të lidhura44
PërmbledhjaSubgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) is a refinement of Nash Equilibrium for sequential games, introduced by Reinhard Selten in 1965. It requires that strategy profiles constitute a Nash Equilibrium in every subgame, eliminating non-credible threats and incredible promises. Backward induction is the primary computational method for finding SPE in finite games.Evolutionary Game Theory applies game-theoretic reasoning to biological evolution and social dynamics, where populations of agents with different strategies interact repeatedly. Introduced by John Maynard Smith and George Price in 1973, the framework uses the concept of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESS) to identify strategy distributions that cannot be invaded by mutant strategies. Replicator dynamics describe how strategy frequencies evolve over time when reproduction is proportional to payoff success.
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ScholarGateKrahasoni metodat: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium · Evolutionary Game Theory. Marrë më 2026-06-18 nga https://scholargate.app/sq/compare