Krahasoni metodat

	Konkurrenca Stackelberg	Ekuilibri i Nash
Fusha	Teoria e lojërave	Teoria e lojërave
Familja	Machine learning	Machine learning
Viti i origjinës	1934	1950
Krijuesi	Heinrich von Stackelberg	John Nash
Lloji	algorithm	algorithm
Burimi themelues	von Stackelberg, H. (1934). Marktform und Gleichgewicht. Julius Springer.	Nash, J. F. (1950). Equilibrium points in N-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36(1), 48-49.
Emërtime të tjera	Quantity Leadership, Sequential Oligopoly, Stackelberg Equilibrium	Lemke-Howson Equilibrium, Completely Labeled Pair
Të lidhura	4	4
Përmbledhja	Stackelberg Competition models sequential oligopolistic markets where one firm (the leader) commits to a quantity first, and other firms (followers) observe this choice and respond. Introduced by Heinrich von Stackelberg in 1934, the model captures first-mover advantage in quantity-setting competition. The resulting Stackelberg Equilibrium, found by backward induction, yields the leader higher profit than simultaneous (Cournot) competition.	Nash Equilibrium is a game-theoretic solution concept where no player can unilaterally deviate to improve their payoff. Formalized by John Nash in 1950, the Lemke-Howson algorithm computationally finds equilibria in bimatrix games by identifying completely labeled vertex pairs in the strategy polytopes.