Krahasoni metodat

	Ekuilibri i Nash	Ekuilibri i Përsosur i Nënlojrave
Fusha	Teoria e lojërave	Teoria e lojërave
Familja	Machine learning	Machine learning
Viti i origjinës	1950	1965
Krijuesi	John Nash	Reinhard Selten
Lloji	algorithm	algorithm
Burimi themelues	Nash, J. F. (1950). Equilibrium points in N-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36(1), 48-49.	Selten, R. (1965). Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit. Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 121, 301-324.
Emërtime të tjera	Lemke-Howson Equilibrium, Completely Labeled Pair	Backward Induction, Sequential Equilibrium, Extensive-Form Equilibrium
Të lidhura	4	4
Përmbledhja	Nash Equilibrium is a game-theoretic solution concept where no player can unilaterally deviate to improve their payoff. Formalized by John Nash in 1950, the Lemke-Howson algorithm computationally finds equilibria in bimatrix games by identifying completely labeled vertex pairs in the strategy polytopes.	Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) is a refinement of Nash Equilibrium for sequential games, introduced by Reinhard Selten in 1965. It requires that strategy profiles constitute a Nash Equilibrium in every subgame, eliminating non-credible threats and incredible promises. Backward induction is the primary computational method for finding SPE in finite games.