Krahasoni metodat

	Bargaining Model of War	Crisis Bargaining Game
Fusha	International Relations	International Relations
Familja	MCDM	MCDM
Viti i origjinës	1995	1994
Krijuesi	James D. Fearon	Formalized by James Fearon and others (building on Schelling)
Lloji	Formal model of war as bargaining failure	Extensive-form game of sequential crisis escalation
Burimi themelues	Fearon, J. D. (1995). Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization, 49(3), 379–414.	Fearon, J. D. (1994). Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes. American Political Science Review, 88(3), 577–592.
Emërtime të tjera	Rationalist Explanations for War, Bargaining Theory of War, Crisis Bargaining Model, Fearon Bargaining Model	International Crisis Game, Escalation Game, Signaling Game of Crisis Bargaining, Deterrence Crisis Game
Të lidhura	3	3
Përmbledhja	The bargaining model of war, given its canonical statement by James Fearon in 'Rationalist Explanations for War' (1995), treats war not as the failure of reason but as a failure of bargaining. Because fighting is costly and uncertain, there almost always exists a peaceful division of the disputed stakes that both rational states would prefer to the gamble of war. The puzzle, and the model's central contribution, is to identify the specific conditions — private information with incentives to misrepresent, commitment problems, and issue indivisibility — under which rational, unitary states nonetheless fail to reach such a settlement.	A crisis bargaining game is a formal, usually extensive-form model in which two states sequentially choose to challenge, escalate, stand firm, or back down during an international dispute, and the analyst solves for the equilibrium pattern of escalation and concession. Building on Schelling's strategy of conflict and given an influential treatment in Fearon's (1994) model of escalation as a war of attrition, these games make explicit how incomplete information about each side's resolve, and the costs each pays for backing down, shape whether a crisis ends in mutual accommodation, capitulation, or war.