Сравнение методов

	Vote Buying Analysis	Clientelism Analysis
Область	Political Economy	Political Economy
Семейство	Regression model	Process / pipeline
Год появления	2008	2005
Автор метода	Simeon Nichter; Ezequiel Gonzalez-Ocantos et al.	Susan C. Stokes; Herbert Kitschelt & Steven Wilkinson
Тип	Measurement-and-targeting regression model	Network-and-exchange pipeline for clientelist accountability
Основополагающий источник	Nichter, S. (2008). Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot. American Political Science Review, 102(1), 19-31.	Stokes, S. C. (2005). Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina. American Political Science Review, 99(3), 315-325.
Другие названия	Electoral Clientelism Measurement, Turnout Buying Analysis, Vote-Buying Targeting Model, List-Experiment Vote Buying	Machine Politics Analysis, Contingent Exchange Analysis, Broker-Mediated Clientelism, Party Machine Network Analysis
Связанные	3	3
Сводка	Vote buying analysis is the measurement-and-modeling toolkit for studying the distribution of private goods or cash in exchange for electoral support. Two problems define the field. First, who is being paid: Simeon Nichter's 2008 article showed that machines frequently engage in turnout buying — paying their own already-loyal supporters to show up — rather than the classic vote buying of swing voters, a distinction with sharp implications for who gets targeted. Second, how to measure something respondents are reluctant to admit: Gonzalez-Ocantos and colleagues' 2012 study demonstrated that direct survey questions sharply understate vote buying because of social-desirability bias and that list experiments recover far higher, more credible prevalence. Vote buying analysis combines such debiased measurement with regression models of targeting.	Clientelism analysis studies the contingent, direct exchange of material benefits for political support and the broker-mediated networks that make such exchange enforceable. Susan Stokes's 2005 formal model of machine politics, built on evidence from Argentina, showed that clientelism inverts normal democratic accountability: instead of voters holding politicians to account, the party machine holds voters to account, rewarding compliance and punishing defection through brokers who can monitor behavior. Kitschelt and Wilkinson's 2007 comparative volume situated this contingent linkage alongside programmatic competition and mapped its variation across democracies. The analysis combines a network view of the party-broker-client machine with a model of how monitoring through dense social ties sustains the bargain.