Сравнение методов

	Public Choice Analysis	Veto Player Analysis
Область	Political Economy	Political Science
Семейство	MCDM	MCDM
Год появления	1962	1995
Автор метода	James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock	George Tsebelis
Тип	Formal framework for collective decision-making	Comparative institutional analysis framework
Основополагающий источник	Buchanan, J. M., & Tullock, G. (1962). The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. University of Michigan Press. ISBN: 9780865972186	Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton University Press. ISBN: 9780691091891
Другие названия	Public Choice Theory, Economics of Politics, Constitutional Political Economy, Virginia School Public Choice	Veto Players Theory, Veto Points Analysis, Tsebelis Veto Player Framework, Policy Stability Analysis
Связанные	4	4
Сводка	Public choice analysis is the application of the methods of economics — methodological individualism, rational self-interest, and equilibrium reasoning — to the study of political and collective decision-making. Pioneered by James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock in their 1962 book The Calculus of Consent and surveyed comprehensively in Dennis Mueller's Public Choice III, it treats voters, politicians, bureaucrats, and interest groups not as benevolent servants of the public interest but as utility-maximizing agents pursuing their own goals within political institutions. A central methodological move is the distinction between constitutional choice — the selection of the rules of the game behind a veil of uncertainty — and in-period choice within those rules. The framework's signature derivation is the optimal decision rule (the optimal majority), found by minimizing the sum of the external costs a rule imposes and the costs of reaching agreement under it.	Veto player analysis is a spatial-institutional framework, developed by George Tsebelis in his 1995 article and 2002 book, for predicting the capacity of a political system to change policy. A veto player is any individual or collective actor whose agreement is required to alter the status quo. The theory shows that the potential for policy change shrinks as the number of veto players grows, as the ideological distance between them widens, and as their internal cohesion increases — three structural variables that together determine a system's policy stability independently of constitutional labels such as presidentialism or parliamentarism.