Сравнение методов

	Partisan Business Cycle Analysis	Economic Voting Analysis
Область	Political Economy	Political Economy
Семейство	Regression model	MCDM
Год появления	1977	1971
Автор метода	Douglas Hibbs (partisan theory); Alberto Alesina (rational partisan theory)	Gerald Kramer; Michael Lewis-Beck & Mary Stegmaier
Тип	Time-series econometric model of partisan macroeconomic outcomes	Formal reward-punishment model of voting
Основополагающий источник	Hibbs, D. A. (1977). Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy. American Political Science Review, 71(4), 1467-1487.	Kramer, G. H. (1971). Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896-1964. American Political Science Review, 65(1), 131-143.
Другие названия	Partisan Theory Analysis, Rational Partisan Theory, Hibbs Partisan Model, Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy	Reward-Punishment Model, Retrospective Voting Model, Economic Vote Function, Responsibility Hypothesis
Связанные	3	4
Сводка	Partisan business cycle analysis tests whether left-wing and right-wing governments produce systematically different macroeconomic outcomes. Douglas Hibbs's 1977 partisan theory argued that because left and right parties represent constituencies with different exposures to unemployment and inflation, left governments durably push for lower unemployment while tolerating higher inflation, and right governments do the reverse. Alberto Alesina's 1987 rational partisan theory added rational expectations and nominal wage contracts: when parties differ and election outcomes are uncertain, the surprise of who wins generates only a transitory burst of partisan divergence in output and employment, which fades once contracts adjust. The empirical method regresses macroeconomic series on a partisan government indicator and post-election dummies to distinguish permanent from transitory effects.	Economic voting analysis is the formal study of how voters reward or punish incumbents according to economic performance. In the reward-punishment (retrospective) model pioneered by Gerald Kramer in 1971, support for the governing party is a function of recent economic outcomes — growth, unemployment, and inflation — so that good times re-elect incumbents and bad times turn them out. Michael Lewis-Beck and Mary Stegmaier's 2000 review consolidated the field, establishing that economic voting is predominantly sociotropic (based on the national economy rather than personal finances) and that its strength depends on the clarity of responsibility: how easily voters can attribute outcomes to the incumbent.