Сравнение методов

	Economic Voting Analysis	Political Budget Cycle Analysis
Область	Political Economy	Political Economy
Семейство	MCDM	Regression model
Год появления	1971	1990
Автор метода	Gerald Kramer; Michael Lewis-Beck & Mary Stegmaier	Kenneth Rogoff (building on William Nordhaus)
Тип	Formal reward-punishment model of voting	Panel econometric model of opportunistic fiscal policy
Основополагающий источник	Kramer, G. H. (1971). Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896-1964. American Political Science Review, 65(1), 131-143.	Rogoff, K. (1990). Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles. American Economic Review, 80(1), 21-36.
Другие названия	Reward-Punishment Model, Retrospective Voting Model, Economic Vote Function, Responsibility Hypothesis	Electoral Budget Cycle Analysis, Opportunistic Fiscal Cycle Model, Pre-Election Fiscal Manipulation Analysis, Election-Year Deficit Model
Связанные	4	3
Сводка	Economic voting analysis is the formal study of how voters reward or punish incumbents according to economic performance. In the reward-punishment (retrospective) model pioneered by Gerald Kramer in 1971, support for the governing party is a function of recent economic outcomes — growth, unemployment, and inflation — so that good times re-elect incumbents and bad times turn them out. Michael Lewis-Beck and Mary Stegmaier's 2000 review consolidated the field, establishing that economic voting is predominantly sociotropic (based on the national economy rather than personal finances) and that its strength depends on the clarity of responsibility: how easily voters can attribute outcomes to the incumbent.	Political budget cycle analysis is an econometric framework for detecting whether incumbent governments manipulate fiscal policy — deficits, public spending, or taxes — in the run-up to elections to signal competence and win votes. Kenneth Rogoff's 1990 equilibrium model gave the idea rational micro-foundations: even forward-looking voters can be temporarily fooled when competence is imperfectly observed, so able incumbents distort the fiscal mix before an election to separate themselves from less able rivals. Empirically the cycle is identified by an election-timing indicator in a fixed-effects panel regression of fiscal outcomes, and Brender and Drazen's 2005 study showed the effect is concentrated in new, inexperienced democracies rather than established ones.