The Problem of Universals
The problem of universals is the classic dispute over whether, in addition to particular things, there exist repeatable universals that explain how distinct particulars can share a single feature.
Definition
The problem of universals asks what, if anything, accounts for the apparent fact that many distinct individuals can have one and the same property in common.
Scope
Covers the one-over-many argument, Platonic and Aristotelian realism, medieval nominalism and conceptualism, and modern positions including predicate, class, and resemblance nominalism.
Core questions
- Do universals exist, or only particulars?
- What explains qualitative agreement among distinct things?
- Are universals transcendent or immanent in their instances?
- Can nominalism account for predication without universals?
Key concepts
- One over many
- Realism
- Nominalism
- Conceptualism
- Resemblance
- Predication
Key theories
- Realism (Platonic and Aristotelian)
- There are universals that many particulars share; for Plato they exist independently as Forms, for Aristotle they exist only in their instances.
- Nominalism
- There are no universals; talk of shared properties is handled by predicates, classes, or resemblances among particulars, as in resemblance nominalism.
History
The problem was posed in antiquity by Plato and Aristotle, sharpened by Porphyry and Boethius, and fiercely debated in the medieval period by Abelard, Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and Ockham. It was revived in analytic metaphysics by Armstrong's defense of universals and contemporary nominalist replies.
Debates
- Does explaining resemblance require universals?
- Realists argue only shared universals explain qualitative agreement; nominalists contend that primitive resemblance or class membership suffices without admitting universals.
Key figures
- Plato
- Aristotle
- Peter Abelard
- William of Ockham
- D. M. Armstrong
- Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra
Related topics
Seminal works
- armstrong1989
- rodriguezPereyra2002
Frequently asked questions
- What is the 'one over many' argument?
- It is the argument that because many distinct things can be, say, red, there must be one thing, the universal redness, that they share. Realists accept the conclusion; nominalists resist it.