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	Analiza kanałów bocznych	Kryptosystem RSA
Dziedzina	Kryptografia	Kryptografia
Rodzina	Machine learning	Machine learning
Rok powstania	1996	1978
Twórca	Paul Kocher	Ronald Rivest
Typ	physical side-channel exploitation	asymmetric encryption algorithm
Źródło pierwotne	Kocher, P. C. (1996). Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and other systems. In Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 1996, LNCS 1109, pp. 104-113.	Rivest, R. L., Shamir, A., & Adleman, L. (1978). A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems. Communications of the ACM, 21(2), 120-126.
Inne nazwy	SCA, timing attack, power analysis, cache attack	RSA encryption, RSA public-key cryptography
Pokrewne	3	4
Podsumowanie	Side-channel analysis is a family of attacks that exploit physical properties of cryptographic implementations (timing, power consumption, electromagnetic emissions, cache behavior) to recover secret keys. Introduced by Paul Kocher in 1996, side-channel attacks have repeatedly broken implementations of theoretically secure cryptosystems by leveraging unintended information leakage. Side-channel analysis has become a critical concern in cryptographic system design, requiring constant-time implementations and physical countermeasures.	RSA is a foundational public-key cryptosystem developed by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman in 1978. It enables secure encryption and digital signatures by using a pair of mathematically linked keys: a public key for encryption and a private key for decryption. RSA's security relies on the computational difficulty of factoring large composite numbers into their prime factors.