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Selectorate Theory Analysis×Expected Utility Model of War×
DziedzinaInternational RelationsInternational Relations
RodzinaMCDMMCDM
Rok powstania20031981
TwórcaBruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson & James MorrowBruce Bueno de Mesquita
TypFormal theory of leader survival and policy choiceFormal rational-choice model of conflict initiation
Źródło pierwotneBueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003). The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. link ↗Bueno de Mesquita, B. (1981). The War Trap. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. link ↗
Inne nazwySelectorate Theory, Logic of Political Survival, Winning Coalition Analysis, Selectorate Model of GovernanceExpected Utility Theory of War, The War Trap Model, Rational Choice Model of War Initiation, Expected-Utility Conflict Model
Pokrewne33
PodsumowanieSelectorate theory, developed by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson, and James Morrow in The Logic of Political Survival (2003), explains policy and foreign-policy behavior as a by-product of leaders' overriding goal: staying in power. Every leader depends on a winning coalition (W) drawn from a larger selectorate (S) of those with a say in choosing leaders. The relative size of W and S determines whether a leader buys loyalty with broad public goods or narrow private rewards — which in turn shapes growth, war, peace, and the survival of regimes.The expected utility model of war, introduced by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita in The War Trap (1981), treats the decision to initiate international conflict as a rational gamble. A leader is modeled as comparing the utility of the outcome they could win against the utility of the outcome they could lose, each weighted by the probability of winning or losing, and is predicted to challenge another state only when this expected utility is positive. It was among the first attempts to derive testable predictions about war initiation from explicit assumptions of rational, utility-maximizing decision making.
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