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| Analiza drzewa zdarzeń oparta na ryzyku× | Analiza Drzewa Zdarzeń (ETA)× | |
|---|---|---|
| Dziedzina≠ | Planowanie eksperymentów | Niezawodność |
| Rodzina | Process / pipeline | Process / pipeline |
| Rok powstania≠ | 1975 (WASH-1400); risk-based integration formalized through 1980s–1990s PRA practice | 2002 |
| Twórca≠ | Originated in nuclear industry (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, WASH-1400 report); risk-based framing developed through probabilistic risk assessment practice | Andrews & Moss |
| Typ≠ | Risk and reliability analysis technique | Forward inductive logic tree |
| Źródło pierwotne≠ | Bedford, T., & Cooke, R. (2001). Probabilistic Risk Analysis: Foundations and Methods. Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 978-0521773201 | Andrews, J. D., & Moss, T. R. (2002). Reliability and Risk Assessment (2nd ed.). Professional Engineering Publishing. ISBN: 978-1-86058-290-5 |
| Inne nazwy | Risk-based ETA, probabilistic event tree analysis, consequence-probability event tree, risk-informed ETA | ETA, Event Sequence Diagram Analysis, Initiating Event Analysis, Olay Ağacı Analizi |
| Pokrewne≠ | 4 | 2 |
| Podsumowanie≠ | Risk-based event tree analysis is a forward-looking, inductive risk assessment technique that models the consequences of an initiating event by tracing binary success/failure branches through safety barriers, then weights each outcome path by its probability to produce quantified risk estimates. Widely applied in nuclear, chemical process, aviation, and infrastructure safety engineering, it sits at the heart of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and supports both design decisions and regulatory compliance. | Event Tree Analysis (ETA) is a forward inductive technique used in reliability and risk engineering to model the possible outcomes that follow an initiating event. Starting from a single undesired event, ETA traces all subsequent event sequences through a binary branching tree representing the success or failure of safety barriers and protective systems. Introduced formally in reliability and risk literature by Andrews and Moss (2002), it is widely applied in nuclear, chemical, and aerospace industries to quantify accident sequence probabilities and guide safety decision-making. |
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