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| Political Survival Analysis× | Coalition Formation Analysis× | |
|---|---|---|
| Dziedzina | Political Economy | Political Economy |
| Rodzina≠ | Survival analysis | MCDM |
| Rok powstania≠ | 2003 | 1962 |
| Twórca≠ | Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al.; Janet Box-Steffensmeier & Bradford Jones | William Riker; Michael Laver & Norman Schofield |
| Typ≠ | Survival / event-history regression model | Formal theory of coalition selection |
| Źródło pierwotne≠ | Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003). The Logic of Political Survival. MIT Press. ISBN: 9780262025461 | Riker, W. H. (1962). The Theory of Political Coalitions. Yale University Press. ISBN: 9780300001754 |
| Inne nazwy | Leader Survival Analysis, Government Duration Analysis, Selectorate Survival Model, Political Event-History Analysis | Minimal Winning Coalition Theory, Riker Size Principle, Coalition Theory, Government Coalition Analysis |
| Pokrewne≠ | 3 | 4 |
| Podsumowanie≠ | Political survival analysis applies survival and event-history models to the time leaders, governments, and regimes remain in power before failing. Methodologically it rests on the hazard-modeling apparatus codified for social scientists by Box-Steffensmeier and Jones in 2004 — the Cox proportional-hazards model and parametric alternatives such as the Weibull, estimated on duration data with censoring. Substantively it is anchored in the selectorate theory of Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow's 2003 The Logic of Political Survival, which explains the hazard of losing office in terms of the size of the winning coalition (W) and the selectorate (S). The model links institutional structure and performance to the risk that an incumbent's tenure ends. | Coalition formation analysis is the formal study of which subset of parties will combine to form a governing or decision-making coalition when no single party commands a majority. William Riker's 1962 The Theory of Political Coalitions supplied the foundational logic: under pure office-seeking, rational politicians form minimal winning coalitions and, by the size principle, the smallest winning coalition possible, so that the spoils of office are divided among as few partners as necessary. Michael Laver and Norman Schofield's 1990 Multiparty Government enriched this with policy-seeking motives, showing that coalitions also tend to be ideologically connected. The framework predicts coalition membership from seat shares and party positions. |
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