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| Równowaga Nasha× | Subgrywalna Równowaga Doskonała× | |
|---|---|---|
| Dziedzina | Teoria gier | Teoria gier |
| Rodzina | Machine learning | Machine learning |
| Rok powstania≠ | 1950 | 1965 |
| Twórca≠ | John Nash | Reinhard Selten |
| Typ | algorithm | algorithm |
| Źródło pierwotne≠ | Nash, J. F. (1950). Equilibrium points in N-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36(1), 48-49. DOI ↗ | Selten, R. (1965). Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit. Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 121, 301-324. link ↗ |
| Inne nazwy≠ | Lemke-Howson Equilibrium, Completely Labeled Pair | Backward Induction, Sequential Equilibrium, Extensive-Form Equilibrium |
| Pokrewne | 4 | 4 |
| Podsumowanie≠ | Nash Equilibrium is a game-theoretic solution concept where no player can unilaterally deviate to improve their payoff. Formalized by John Nash in 1950, the Lemke-Howson algorithm computationally finds equilibria in bimatrix games by identifying completely labeled vertex pairs in the strategy polytopes. | Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) is a refinement of Nash Equilibrium for sequential games, introduced by Reinhard Selten in 1965. It requires that strategy profiles constitute a Nash Equilibrium in every subgame, eliminating non-credible threats and incredible promises. Backward induction is the primary computational method for finding SPE in finite games. |
| ScholarGateZbiór danych ↗ |
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