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	Równowaga Nasha	Wartość Shapleya
Dziedzina	Teoria gier	Teoria gier
Rodzina	Machine learning	Machine learning
Rok powstania	1950	1953
Twórca	John Nash	Lloyd Shapley
Typ	algorithm	algorithm
Źródło pierwotne	Nash, J. F. (1950). Equilibrium points in N-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36(1), 48-49.	Shapley, L. S. (1953). A value for n-person games. In H. W. Kuhn & A. W. Tucker (Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games II (pp. 307-317). Princeton University Press.
Inne nazwy	Lemke-Howson Equilibrium, Completely Labeled Pair	Fair Division, Cooperative Game Solution, Dividend Vector
Pokrewne	4	4
Podsumowanie	Nash Equilibrium is a game-theoretic solution concept where no player can unilaterally deviate to improve their payoff. Formalized by John Nash in 1950, the Lemke-Howson algorithm computationally finds equilibria in bimatrix games by identifying completely labeled vertex pairs in the strategy polytopes.	The Shapley Value is a solution concept for coalition games that distributes total payoff fairly among players based on their marginal contributions to coalitions. Introduced by Lloyd Shapley in 1953, the Shapley Value is the unique payoff distribution that satisfies four intuitive axioms: efficiency (total payoff is distributed), symmetry (identical players receive equal payoff), null player (players contributing nothing receive nothing), and additivity across games.