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	Analiza drzewa zdarzeń z wieloma odpowiedziami	Wielowyjściowa analiza drzewa błędów
Dziedzina	Planowanie eksperymentów	Planowanie eksperymentów
Rodzina	Process / pipeline	Process / pipeline
Rok powstania	1975 (ETA); multi-response extension: 1990s–2000s	1961 (FTA); multi-response extensions developed from the 1980s onward
Twórca	Developed from Event Tree Analysis (originated at WASH-1400 nuclear safety study, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1975); multi-response extension adapted from design-of-experiments and reliability engineering practice	H. A. Watson (Bell Labs); extended by W. E. Vesely and others for multi-output contexts
Typ	Probabilistic safety and reliability analysis with multiple simultaneous response outcomes	Deductive reliability and risk analysis
Źródło pierwotne	Stamatelatos, M., Vesely, W., Dugan, J., Fragola, J., Minarick, J., & Railsback, J. (2002). Fault Tree Handbook with Aerospace Applications. NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance.	Vesely, W. E., Goldberg, F. F., Roberts, N. H., & Haasl, D. F. (1981). Fault Tree Handbook. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-0492.
Inne nazwy	MR-ETA, multi-output event tree analysis, multi-response ETA, probabilistic event tree with multiple responses	MR-FTA, multi-output fault tree analysis, multi-criterion fault tree analysis, multi-response FTA
Pokrewne	5	5
Podsumowanie	Multi-response Event Tree Analysis (MR-ETA) extends classical event tree analysis by simultaneously tracking multiple system performance or safety response variables across all accident sequences. Instead of evaluating a single outcome (e.g., probability of failure), it propagates several concurrent response metrics — such as damage severity, downtime, cost, and environmental impact — through the event tree branches, enabling richer risk characterization and trade-off decisions under a single probabilistic framework.	Multi-response fault tree analysis (MR-FTA) extends classical fault tree analysis to systems where multiple distinct top-level failure events or outcome metrics must be evaluated simultaneously. Rather than constructing a single tree for one top event, the analyst builds and quantifies parallel trees — one per response — then aggregates results to rank critical failure paths across all responses at once, enabling holistic system risk prioritization.