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	Minimal Group Paradigm	Public Goods Game	Social Relations Model
Dziedzina	Psychologia społeczna	Psychologia społeczna	Psychologia społeczna
Rodzina	Process / pipeline	Process / pipeline	Regression model
Rok powstania	1971	2000	2006
Twórca	Henri Tajfel and colleagues	Experimental economics tradition; Fehr & Gachter (cooperation and punishment)	David A. Kenny and colleagues
Typ	Experimental paradigm for intergroup discrimination	Multi-player social-dilemma paradigm	Variance-decomposition model for dyadic data
Źródło pierwotne	Tajfel, H., Billig, M. G., Bundy, R. P., & Flament, C. (1971). Social categorization and intergroup behaviour. European Journal of Social Psychology, 1(2), 149-178.	Fehr, E., & Gachter, S. (2000). Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments. American Economic Review, 90(4), 980-994.	Kenny, D. A., Kashy, D. A., & Cook, W. L. (2006). Dyadic Data Analysis. Guilford Press. ISBN: 9781572309869
Inne nazwy	Minimal Group Experiment, Tajfel Matrices, Mere Categorization Paradigm	Voluntary Contribution Mechanism, Common-Pool Contribution Game, Linear Public Goods Game	SRM, Kenny Social Relations Model, Round-Robin Variance Partition
Pokrewne	3	3	3
Podsumowanie	The minimal group paradigm is an experimental procedure, introduced by Henri Tajfel and colleagues in 1971, that strips intergroup conflict down to its barest possible cause: mere categorization. Participants are sorted into two groups on a trivial or random basis (for example, an alleged preference for one painter over another, or a coin toss), never meet other members, gain nothing personally, and then allocate points between anonymous in-group and out-group members using structured reward matrices. The striking and repeatedly replicated finding is that people favor their own group even when the category is meaningless and favoritism brings them no material gain. The paradigm became the empirical cornerstone of social identity theory, demonstrating that the cognitive act of dividing the social world into 'us' and 'them' is itself sufficient to produce discrimination.	The public goods game is the canonical multi-person social dilemma used to study cooperation. Each member of a group is endowed with money and simultaneously decides how much to keep privately and how much to contribute to a common pool; the pool is multiplied and split equally among all members regardless of contribution. Because the marginal per-capita return is less than one but the group return exceeds one, every individual is privately better off free-riding while the group is collectively better off if all contribute -- the defining tension of a social dilemma. Experiments consistently show people contribute well above the self-interested zero, but contributions decay over repeated rounds unless institutions intervene. Fehr and Gachter's influential demonstration that allowing players to pay to punish free-riders restores and sustains high cooperation made the paradigm central to research on norms, altruistic punishment, and collective action.	The Social Relations Model (SRM), developed by David Kenny and colleagues, is a variance-decomposition framework for analyzing interpersonal perception and behavior in groups. When every member of a group rates (or behaves toward) every other member in a round-robin design, each rating reflects three distinct sources: the perceiver's general tendency to see others a certain way (actor effect), the target's general tendency to be seen that way by others (partner effect), and the unique adjustment a particular perceiver makes for a particular target (relationship effect), plus error. The SRM partitions the total variance into these components and estimates two kinds of reciprocity -- generalized (do people who like others tend to be liked?) and dyadic (do specific pairs uniquely reciprocate?). By separating the perceiver, the target, and their unique relationship, the SRM answers fundamental questions about whether interpersonal judgments lie in the eye of the beholder, the qualities of the person judged, or the chemistry of the dyad.