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	Ewolucyjna Teoria Gier	Równowaga Nasha
Dziedzina	Teoria gier	Teoria gier
Rodzina	Machine learning	Machine learning
Rok powstania	1973	1950
Twórca	John Maynard Smith, George Price	John Nash
Typ	algorithm	algorithm
Źródło pierwotne	Smith, J. M., & Price, G. R. (1973). The logic of animal conflict. Nature, 246(5427), 15-18.	Nash, J. F. (1950). Equilibrium points in N-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36(1), 48-49.
Inne nazwy	ESS, Evolutionarily Stable Strategy, Replicator Dynamics	Lemke-Howson Equilibrium, Completely Labeled Pair
Pokrewne	4	4
Podsumowanie	Evolutionary Game Theory applies game-theoretic reasoning to biological evolution and social dynamics, where populations of agents with different strategies interact repeatedly. Introduced by John Maynard Smith and George Price in 1973, the framework uses the concept of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESS) to identify strategy distributions that cannot be invaded by mutant strategies. Replicator dynamics describe how strategy frequencies evolve over time when reproduction is proportional to payoff success.	Nash Equilibrium is a game-theoretic solution concept where no player can unilaterally deviate to improve their payoff. Formalized by John Nash in 1950, the Lemke-Howson algorithm computationally finds equilibria in bimatrix games by identifying completely labeled vertex pairs in the strategy polytopes.