Porównaj metody
Przeglądaj wybrane metody obok siebie; wiersze, które się różnią, są wyróżnione.
| Równowaga Arrowa-Debreu× | Równowaga Nasha× | |
|---|---|---|
| Dziedzina | Teoria gier | Teoria gier |
| Rodzina | Machine learning | Machine learning |
| Rok powstania≠ | 1954 | 1950 |
| Twórca≠ | Kenneth Arrow, Gerard Debreu | John Nash |
| Typ | algorithm | algorithm |
| Źródło pierwotne≠ | Arrow, K. J., & Debreu, G. (1954). Existence of an equilibrium for competitive economies. Econometrica, 22(3), 265-290. DOI ↗ | Nash, J. F. (1950). Equilibrium points in N-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36(1), 48-49. DOI ↗ |
| Inne nazwy≠ | Walrasian Equilibrium, General Equilibrium, Competitive Equilibrium | Lemke-Howson Equilibrium, Completely Labeled Pair |
| Pokrewne | 4 | 4 |
| Podsumowanie≠ | The Arrow-Debreu model is a general equilibrium framework where prices adjust to clear all markets simultaneously, and consumers and firms optimize given those prices. Introduced by Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu in 1954, the model extends Adam Smith's invisible hand concept into a rigorous mathematical framework. Arrow-Debreu equilibrium proves existence, uniqueness (under certain conditions), and Pareto efficiency of competitive equilibria. | Nash Equilibrium is a game-theoretic solution concept where no player can unilaterally deviate to improve their payoff. Formalized by John Nash in 1950, the Lemke-Howson algorithm computationally finds equilibria in bimatrix games by identifying completely labeled vertex pairs in the strategy polytopes. |
| ScholarGateZbiór danych ↗ |
|
|