Methoden vergelijken
Bekijk de geselecteerde methoden naast elkaar; rijen die verschillen zijn gemarkeerd.
| Subgame-perfecte evenwicht× | Stackelberg-concurrentie× | |
|---|---|---|
| Vakgebied | Speltheorie | Speltheorie |
| Familie | Machine learning | Machine learning |
| Jaar van ontstaan≠ | 1965 | 1934 |
| Grondlegger≠ | Reinhard Selten | Heinrich von Stackelberg |
| Type | algorithm | algorithm |
| Oorspronkelijke bron≠ | Selten, R. (1965). Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit. Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 121, 301-324. link ↗ | von Stackelberg, H. (1934). Marktform und Gleichgewicht. Julius Springer. link ↗ |
| Aliassen | Backward Induction, Sequential Equilibrium, Extensive-Form Equilibrium | Quantity Leadership, Sequential Oligopoly, Stackelberg Equilibrium |
| Verwant | 4 | 4 |
| Samenvatting≠ | Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) is a refinement of Nash Equilibrium for sequential games, introduced by Reinhard Selten in 1965. It requires that strategy profiles constitute a Nash Equilibrium in every subgame, eliminating non-credible threats and incredible promises. Backward induction is the primary computational method for finding SPE in finite games. | Stackelberg Competition models sequential oligopolistic markets where one firm (the leader) commits to a quantity first, and other firms (followers) observe this choice and respond. Introduced by Heinrich von Stackelberg in 1934, the model captures first-mover advantage in quantity-setting competition. The resulting Stackelberg Equilibrium, found by backward induction, yields the leader higher profit than simultaneous (Cournot) competition. |
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