Methoden vergelijken

	Political Survival Analysis	State Autonomy Analysis
Vakgebied	Political Economy	Political Economy
Familie	Survival analysis	Process / pipeline
Jaar van ontstaan	2003	1984
Grondlegger	Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al.; Janet Box-Steffensmeier & Bradford Jones	Theda Skocpol, Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer & Michael Mann
Type	Survival / event-history regression model	State-centered analytical framework
Oorspronkelijke bron	Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003). The Logic of Political Survival. MIT Press. ISBN: 9780262025461	Evans, P. B., Rueschemeyer, D., & Skocpol, T. (Eds.). (1985). Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 9780521313131
Aliassen	Leader Survival Analysis, Government Duration Analysis, Selectorate Survival Model, Political Event-History Analysis	State-Centered Analysis, Relative Autonomy Analysis, Infrastructural Power Analysis, Bringing the State Back In Approach
Verwant	3	3
Samenvatting	Political survival analysis applies survival and event-history models to the time leaders, governments, and regimes remain in power before failing. Methodologically it rests on the hazard-modeling apparatus codified for social scientists by Box-Steffensmeier and Jones in 2004 — the Cox proportional-hazards model and parametric alternatives such as the Weibull, estimated on duration data with censoring. Substantively it is anchored in the selectorate theory of Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow's 2003 The Logic of Political Survival, which explains the hazard of losing office in terms of the size of the winning coalition (W) and the selectorate (S). The model links institutional structure and performance to the risk that an incumbent's tenure ends.	State autonomy analysis treats the state not as a neutral arena or a simple instrument of the dominant class but as an organization with interests, capacities, and powers of its own. Crystallized in the 1985 volume Bringing the State Back In edited by Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, and given a sharp conceptual edge by Michael Mann's 1984 distinction between despotic and infrastructural power, the framework asks two linked questions: how far can a state formulate goals independent of the preferences of dominant social classes (autonomy), and how effectively can it actually implement those goals across its territory (capacity)? The approach reoriented comparative political economy away from purely society-centered explanations.