Methoden vergelijken
Bekijk de geselecteerde methoden naast elkaar; rijen die verschillen zijn gemarkeerd.
| Veiling met de hoogste prijs× | Stackelberg-concurrentie× | |
|---|---|---|
| Vakgebied | Speltheorie | Speltheorie |
| Familie | Machine learning | Machine learning |
| Jaar van ontstaan≠ | 1961 | 1934 |
| Grondlegger≠ | William Vickrey | Heinrich von Stackelberg |
| Type | algorithm | algorithm |
| Oorspronkelijke bron≠ | Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed bids. The Journal of Finance, 16(1), 8-37. DOI ↗ | von Stackelberg, H. (1934). Marktform und Gleichgewicht. Julius Springer. link ↗ |
| Aliassen | FPSB, Sealed-Bid Auction, Bid-Equal-Price Auction | Quantity Leadership, Sequential Oligopoly, Stackelberg Equilibrium |
| Verwant | 4 | 4 |
| Samenvatting≠ | A first-price auction is a sealed-bid mechanism where all participants submit bids simultaneously without knowing others' bids. The highest bidder wins and pays their own bid (the price they offered). Systematically analyzed by William Vickrey in 1961, first-price auctions require bidders to balance between winning and profit, leading to strategic underbidding relative to true valuations in equilibrium. | Stackelberg Competition models sequential oligopolistic markets where one firm (the leader) commits to a quantity first, and other firms (followers) observe this choice and respond. Introduced by Heinrich von Stackelberg in 1934, the model captures first-mover advantage in quantity-setting competition. The resulting Stackelberg Equilibrium, found by backward induction, yields the leader higher profit than simultaneous (Cournot) competition. |
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