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Keseimbangan Sempurna Subpermainan×Persaingan Stackelberg×
BidangTeori PermainanTeori Permainan
KeluargaMachine learningMachine learning
Tahun asal19651934
PengasasReinhard SeltenHeinrich von Stackelberg
Jenisalgorithmalgorithm
Sumber perintisSelten, R. (1965). Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit. Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 121, 301-324. link ↗von Stackelberg, H. (1934). Marktform und Gleichgewicht. Julius Springer. link ↗
AliasBackward Induction, Sequential Equilibrium, Extensive-Form EquilibriumQuantity Leadership, Sequential Oligopoly, Stackelberg Equilibrium
Berkaitan44
RingkasanSubgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) is a refinement of Nash Equilibrium for sequential games, introduced by Reinhard Selten in 1965. It requires that strategy profiles constitute a Nash Equilibrium in every subgame, eliminating non-credible threats and incredible promises. Backward induction is the primary computational method for finding SPE in finite games.Stackelberg Competition models sequential oligopolistic markets where one firm (the leader) commits to a quantity first, and other firms (followers) observe this choice and respond. Introduced by Heinrich von Stackelberg in 1934, the model captures first-mover advantage in quantity-setting competition. The resulting Stackelberg Equilibrium, found by backward induction, yields the leader higher profit than simultaneous (Cournot) competition.
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ScholarGateBandingkan kaedah: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium · Stackelberg Competition. Dicapai 2026-06-19 daripada https://scholargate.app/ms/compare