Bandingkan kaedah

	Social Relations Model	Trust Game
Bidang	Psikologi Sosial	Psikologi Sosial
Keluarga	Regression model	Process / pipeline
Tahun asal	2006	1995
Pengasas	David A. Kenny and colleagues	Joyce Berg, John Dickhaut & Kevin McCabe
Jenis	Variance-decomposition model for dyadic data	Behavioral economic game as a social-psychology paradigm
Sumber perintis	Kenny, D. A., Kashy, D. A., & Cook, W. L. (2006). Dyadic Data Analysis. Guilford Press. ISBN: 9781572309869	Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995). Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History. Games and Economic Behavior, 10(1), 122-142.
Alias	SRM, Kenny Social Relations Model, Round-Robin Variance Partition	Investment Game, Berg Game, Two-Player Trust Game
Berkaitan	3	3
Ringkasan	The Social Relations Model (SRM), developed by David Kenny and colleagues, is a variance-decomposition framework for analyzing interpersonal perception and behavior in groups. When every member of a group rates (or behaves toward) every other member in a round-robin design, each rating reflects three distinct sources: the perceiver's general tendency to see others a certain way (actor effect), the target's general tendency to be seen that way by others (partner effect), and the unique adjustment a particular perceiver makes for a particular target (relationship effect), plus error. The SRM partitions the total variance into these components and estimates two kinds of reciprocity -- generalized (do people who like others tend to be liked?) and dyadic (do specific pairs uniquely reciprocate?). By separating the perceiver, the target, and their unique relationship, the SRM answers fundamental questions about whether interpersonal judgments lie in the eye of the beholder, the qualities of the person judged, or the chemistry of the dyad.	The trust game, introduced by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe in 1995 (and often called the investment game), is a two-player exchange that operationalizes interpersonal trust and reciprocity in money. An investor receives an endowment and may send any portion to an anonymous trustee; the experimenter multiplies the transfer (typically tripling it); the trustee then decides how much, if any, to return. Standard game theory with purely self-interested players predicts the investor should send nothing because a selfish trustee returns nothing -- yet investors reliably send substantial amounts and trustees reliably return some, contradicting the narrow self-interest prediction. Because the amount sent cleanly measures trust and the amount returned measures trustworthiness, the paradigm became a workhorse in social psychology, behavioral economics, and neuroscience for studying social preferences and cooperation between strangers.