Ultimatum Game
The Ultimatum Game is a two-player economic decision-making task that reveals preferences for fairness and social norms. One player (proposer) receives money and offers a portion to a second player (responder). The responder accepts or rejects the offer; if accepted, both receive their share; if rejected, both receive nothing. Economic theory predicts responders should accept any positive offer (better than zero), yet responders often reject unfair offers. This gap between predictions and behavior reveals that fairness concerns, equity sensitivity, and social punishment shape economic decisions.
出典記録
引用は手法の出典記録からそのままコピーされています。それらからレベルごとの検証は推論されません。
- Güth, W., Schmittberger, R., & Schwarze, B. (1982). An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 3(4), 367-388. · DOI 10.1016/0167-2681(82)90011-7
- Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., et al. (2005). 'Economic man' in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28(6), 795-855. · DOI 10.1017/S0140525X05000142
- Sanfey, A. G., Rilling, J. K., Aronson, J. A., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2003). The neural basis of economic decision-making in the ultimatum game. Science, 300(5626), 1755-1758. · DOI 10.1126/science.1082976
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