Transaction Cost Economics Analysis
Transaction cost economics (TCE) analysis explains how firms should organize their economic exchanges -- whether to buy on the market, make in-house, or use a hybrid arrangement -- by minimizing the sum of production and transaction costs. Building on Coase's question of why firms exist, Oliver Williamson's 1979 article and 1985 book The Economic Institutions of Capitalism developed a comparative framework in which the efficient governance of a transaction depends on its attributes, above all asset specificity, together with uncertainty and frequency. Because human actors are boundedly rational and potentially opportunistic, contracts are inevitably incomplete; when a transaction requires investments specialized to a particular partner, those investments create quasi-rents that the partner can try to expropriate -- the hold-up problem. The central prescription, the discriminating-alignment hypothesis, is to match each transaction to the governance structure -- market, hybrid, or hierarchy -- that economizes on these transaction costs, making the make-or-buy decision a question of comparative institutional efficiency.
Izvorni zapis
Citati kopirani doslovno iz izvornog zapisa metode. Ne impliciraju nikakvu provjeru na razini tvrdnje.
- Williamson, O. E. (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting. New York: Free Press. · ISBN 9780029348208
- Williamson, O. E. (1979). Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations. Journal of Law and Economics, 22(2), 233-261. · DOI 10.1086/466942
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