השוואת שיטות

	ניתוח ערוץ צדדי	קריפטוגרפיה מבוססת עקומים אליפטיים
תחום	קריפטוגרפיה	קריפטוגרפיה
משפחה	Machine learning	Machine learning
שנת המקור	1996	1985
הוגה השיטה	Paul Kocher	Neal Koblitz
סוג	physical side-channel exploitation	asymmetric encryption and key agreement
מקור מכונן	Kocher, P. C. (1996). Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and other systems. In Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 1996, LNCS 1109, pp. 104-113.	Miller, V. S. (1985). Use of Elliptic Curves in Cryptography. In Proceedings of the Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 1985, LNCS 218, pp. 417-426.
כינויים	SCA, timing attack, power analysis, cache attack	ECC, elliptic curve cryptosystem
קשורות	3	3
תקציר	Side-channel analysis is a family of attacks that exploit physical properties of cryptographic implementations (timing, power consumption, electromagnetic emissions, cache behavior) to recover secret keys. Introduced by Paul Kocher in 1996, side-channel attacks have repeatedly broken implementations of theoretically secure cryptosystems by leveraging unintended information leakage. Side-channel analysis has become a critical concern in cryptographic system design, requiring constant-time implementations and physical countermeasures.	Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is a public-key cryptosystem based on the algebraic structure of elliptic curves over finite fields. Proposed independently by Neal Koblitz and Victor Miller in 1985, ECC offers equivalent security to RSA with much smaller key sizes. Modern cryptography increasingly favors ECC for its efficiency: a 256-bit ECC key provides security comparable to a 2048-bit RSA key, making it ideal for constrained environments and high-performance systems.