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Stackelberg-kilpailu×Tasopelitason tasapaino×
TieteenalaPeliteoriaPeliteoria
MenetelmäperheMachine learningMachine learning
Syntyvuosi19341965
KehittäjäHeinrich von StackelbergReinhard Selten
Tyyppialgorithmalgorithm
Alkuperäislähdevon Stackelberg, H. (1934). Marktform und Gleichgewicht. Julius Springer. link ↗Selten, R. (1965). Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit. Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 121, 301-324. link ↗
RinnakkaisnimetQuantity Leadership, Sequential Oligopoly, Stackelberg EquilibriumBackward Induction, Sequential Equilibrium, Extensive-Form Equilibrium
Liittyvät44
TiivistelmäStackelberg Competition models sequential oligopolistic markets where one firm (the leader) commits to a quantity first, and other firms (followers) observe this choice and respond. Introduced by Heinrich von Stackelberg in 1934, the model captures first-mover advantage in quantity-setting competition. The resulting Stackelberg Equilibrium, found by backward induction, yields the leader higher profit than simultaneous (Cournot) competition.Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) is a refinement of Nash Equilibrium for sequential games, introduced by Reinhard Selten in 1965. It requires that strategy profiles constitute a Nash Equilibrium in every subgame, eliminating non-credible threats and incredible promises. Backward induction is the primary computational method for finding SPE in finite games.
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