Vertaile menetelmiä
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| Riskipohjainen vikapuuanalyysi× | Tapahtumapuuanalyysi (ETA)× | |
|---|---|---|
| Tieteenala≠ | Koesuunnittelu | Luotettavuus |
| Menetelmäperhe | Process / pipeline | Process / pipeline |
| Syntyvuosi≠ | 1961 (FTA origin); risk-based integration formalised 1975–1981 | 2002 |
| Kehittäjä≠ | H.A. Watson (Bell Labs) and developed further by Boeing/U.S. Air Force; risk-based extension via NRC probabilistic risk assessment programs | Andrews & Moss |
| Tyyppi≠ | Quantitative safety and reliability analysis | Forward inductive logic tree |
| Alkuperäislähde≠ | Vesely, W. E., Goldberg, F. F., Roberts, N. H., & Haasl, D. F. (1981). Fault Tree Handbook. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-0492. link ↗ | Andrews, J. D., & Moss, T. R. (2002). Reliability and Risk Assessment (2nd ed.). Professional Engineering Publishing. ISBN: 978-1-86058-290-5 |
| Rinnakkaisnimet | RB-FTA, risk-informed FTA, quantitative fault tree analysis, probabilistic fault tree analysis | ETA, Event Sequence Diagram Analysis, Initiating Event Analysis, Olay Ağacı Analizi |
| Liittyvät≠ | 6 | 2 |
| Tiivistelmä≠ | Risk-based fault tree analysis (RB-FTA) combines classical fault tree analysis with explicit quantitative risk assessment. Starting from an undesired top event, the analyst decomposes it into contributing causes using AND/OR logic gates, assigns failure probabilities to basic events from reliability databases or historical data, and then propagates those probabilities through the tree to compute top-event likelihood. The result is expressed as risk — probability weighted by consequence severity — enabling prioritisation of safety interventions by their actual risk reduction impact. | Event Tree Analysis (ETA) is a forward inductive technique used in reliability and risk engineering to model the possible outcomes that follow an initiating event. Starting from a single undesired event, ETA traces all subsequent event sequences through a binary branching tree representing the success or failure of safety barriers and protective systems. Introduced formally in reliability and risk literature by Andrews and Moss (2002), it is widely applied in nuclear, chemical, and aerospace industries to quantify accident sequence probabilities and guide safety decision-making. |
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