Vertaile menetelmiä

	Expected Utility Model of War	Power Transition Analysis
Tieteenala	International Relations	International Relations
Menetelmäperhe	MCDM	Process / pipeline
Syntyvuosi	1981	1980
Kehittäjä	Bruce Bueno de Mesquita	A. F. K. Organski & Jacek Kugler
Tyyppi	Formal rational-choice model of conflict initiation	Theory-driven observational analysis of war between rising and dominant powers
Alkuperäislähde	Bueno de Mesquita, B. (1981). The War Trap. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.	Organski, A. F. K., & Kugler, J. (1980). The War Ledger. University of Chicago Press.
Rinnakkaisnimet	Expected Utility Theory of War, The War Trap Model, Rational Choice Model of War Initiation, Expected-Utility Conflict Model	Power Transition Theory Analysis, Power Parity and War Analysis, Hegemonic Transition Analysis, Overtaking and War Analysis
Liittyvät	3	3
Tiivistelmä	The expected utility model of war, introduced by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita in The War Trap (1981), treats the decision to initiate international conflict as a rational gamble. A leader is modeled as comparing the utility of the outcome they could win against the utility of the outcome they could lose, each weighted by the probability of winning or losing, and is predicted to challenge another state only when this expected utility is positive. It was among the first attempts to derive testable predictions about war initiation from explicit assumptions of rational, utility-maximizing decision making.	Power transition analysis examines when and why war breaks out between a dominant state and a rising challenger as their relative power converges. Originating in A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler's The War Ledger (1980), it holds that the international system is hierarchical and most dangerous not at moments of clear preponderance but when a dissatisfied rising power approaches parity with the dominant state — and it operationalizes this by tracking relative national capabilities over time and relating overtaking to the onset of major war.