Vertaile menetelmiä

	Crisis Bargaining Game	Deterrence Modeling
Tieteenala	International Relations	International Relations
Menetelmäperhe	MCDM	MCDM
Syntyvuosi	1994	2000
Kehittäjä	Formalized by James Fearon and others (building on Schelling)	Classical deterrence theorists (Schelling); formal perfect deterrence by Frank Zagare & D. Marc Kilgour
Tyyppi	Extensive-form game of sequential crisis escalation	Game-theoretic model of threat-based conflict prevention
Alkuperäislähde	Fearon, J. D. (1994). Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes. American Political Science Review, 88(3), 577–592.	Zagare, F. C., & Kilgour, D. M. (2000). Perfect Deterrence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rinnakkaisnimet	International Crisis Game, Escalation Game, Signaling Game of Crisis Bargaining, Deterrence Crisis Game	Deterrence Theory Modeling, Rational Deterrence Models, Perfect Deterrence Game, Extended Deterrence Analysis
Liittyvät	3	3
Tiivistelmä	A crisis bargaining game is a formal, usually extensive-form model in which two states sequentially choose to challenge, escalate, stand firm, or back down during an international dispute, and the analyst solves for the equilibrium pattern of escalation and concession. Building on Schelling's strategy of conflict and given an influential treatment in Fearon's (1994) model of escalation as a war of attrition, these games make explicit how incomplete information about each side's resolve, and the costs each pays for backing down, shape whether a crisis ends in mutual accommodation, capitulation, or war.	Deterrence modeling uses game theory to analyze when a defender can dissuade a challenger from aggression by threatening unacceptable costs. Classical deterrence theory, rooted in Schelling's work and Cold War nuclear strategy, was reformulated by Frank Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour in Perfect Deterrence (2000) into a family of incomplete-information games. These models make precise the two requirements a deterrent threat must meet — capability (the means to inflict the cost) and credibility (a genuine willingness to carry it out) — and identify the equilibrium conditions under which deterrence succeeds, fails, or collapses into conflict.