Vertaile menetelmiä

	Capital Mobility Analysis	Central Bank Independence Index
Tieteenala	Political Economy	Political Economy
Menetelmäperhe	Regression model	Process / pipeline
Syntyvuosi	1963	1992
Kehittäjä	Robert Mundell (trilemma); Geoffrey Garrett & Dennis Quinn (political economy)	Alex Cukierman, Steven B. Webb & Bilin Neyapti
Tyyppi	Panel regression analysis of policy under capital openness	Composite institutional index
Alkuperäislähde	Mundell, R. A. (1963). Capital Mobility and Stabilization Policy under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates. Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 29(4), 475-485.	Cukierman, A., Webb, S. B., & Neyapti, B. (1992). Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes. World Bank Economic Review, 6(3), 353-398.
Rinnakkaisnimet	Capital Account Openness Analysis, Globalization Constraint Analysis, Race to the Bottom Analysis, Policy Autonomy Under Capital Mobility	CWN Index, Cukierman CBI Index, Legal Central Bank Independence Index, CBI Index
Liittyvät	3	2
Tiivistelmä	Capital mobility analysis studies how the international mobility of capital constrains — or fails to constrain — national economic policy. Robert Mundell's 1963 work established the open-economy trilemma: a country cannot simultaneously maintain a fixed exchange rate, free capital movement, and an independent monetary policy, and must give up one. The political economy literature, exemplified by Geoffrey Garrett's 1998 Partisan Politics in the Global Economy and Dennis Quinn's 1997 measurement of financial liberalization, asks whether rising capital mobility forces a 'race to the bottom' in taxes and welfare or instead leaves room for partisan and compensatory policy. The empirical method regresses policy or taxation outcomes on measures of capital-account openness — the Quinn index, the Chinn-Ito index — with partisan interactions.	The central bank independence index of Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992) is the foundational quantitative measure of how insulated a monetary authority is from political control. It reads the central bank's statute and codes dozens of legal provisions into four groups — the appointment, tenure, and dismissal of the chief executive; who holds authority over monetary policy formulation and conflict resolution; the bank's statutory objectives, especially the primacy of price stability; and the limits on the bank's lending to government — then scores each provision on a zero-to-one scale and aggregates them with explicit weights into a legal independence index running from zero to one. To capture the gap between law and practice, the authors complement this de jure index with a de facto measure: the turnover rate of central bank governors. The framework launched the empirical literature linking institutional design to inflation performance.