مقایسهٔ روش‌ها

	تعادل کامل زیربازی	Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
حوزه	نظریه بازی‌ها	نظریه بازی‌ها
خانواده	Machine learning	Machine learning
سال پیدایش	1965	1967
پدیدآور	Reinhard Selten	John Harsanyi
نوع	algorithm	algorithm
منبع بنیادین	Selten, R. (1965). Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit. Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 121, 301-324.	Harsanyi, J. C. (1967). Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players, Parts I, II, and III. Management Science, 14(3), 159-182.
نام‌های دیگر	Backward Induction, Sequential Equilibrium, Extensive-Form Equilibrium	BNE, Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, Type-Contingent Equilibrium
مرتبط	4	4
خلاصه	Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) is a refinement of Nash Equilibrium for sequential games, introduced by Reinhard Selten in 1965. It requires that strategy profiles constitute a Nash Equilibrium in every subgame, eliminating non-credible threats and incredible promises. Backward induction is the primary computational method for finding SPE in finite games.	Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) extends Nash Equilibrium to games with incomplete information, where players lack full knowledge of others' payoff functions. Introduced by John Harsanyi in 1967, BNE models strategic interaction under uncertainty by representing unknown payoffs as players' private types drawn from a probability distribution. Equilibrium is found by solving for type-contingent strategies that are best responses to all possible type realizations.