مقایسهٔ روش‌ها

	رقابت استاکلبرگ	تعادل کامل زیربازی
حوزه	نظریه بازی‌ها	نظریه بازی‌ها
خانواده	Machine learning	Machine learning
سال پیدایش	1934	1965
پدیدآور	Heinrich von Stackelberg	Reinhard Selten
نوع	algorithm	algorithm
منبع بنیادین	von Stackelberg, H. (1934). Marktform und Gleichgewicht. Julius Springer.	Selten, R. (1965). Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit. Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 121, 301-324.
نام‌های دیگر	Quantity Leadership, Sequential Oligopoly, Stackelberg Equilibrium	Backward Induction, Sequential Equilibrium, Extensive-Form Equilibrium
مرتبط	4	4
خلاصه	Stackelberg Competition models sequential oligopolistic markets where one firm (the leader) commits to a quantity first, and other firms (followers) observe this choice and respond. Introduced by Heinrich von Stackelberg in 1934, the model captures first-mover advantage in quantity-setting competition. The resulting Stackelberg Equilibrium, found by backward induction, yields the leader higher profit than simultaneous (Cournot) competition.	Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) is a refinement of Nash Equilibrium for sequential games, introduced by Reinhard Selten in 1965. It requires that strategy profiles constitute a Nash Equilibrium in every subgame, eliminating non-credible threats and incredible promises. Backward induction is the primary computational method for finding SPE in finite games.